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Abstract
*
We present the economic analysis of mergers and its policy implications
in a non-technical way. We also review the main features of the EC
merger policy and suggest some modifications which would help to bring
it in line with economic thinking. More specifically, we argue that the EC
merger policy has two main distortions. The first one is that it prohibits
only mergers which create or reinforce dominance, whereas economic
analysis suggests that there exist mergers which are detrimental to
welfare even though they do not raise issues of dominance. The second
distortion is that the EC merger policy does not recognise the role played
by cost savings which might give rise to overall beneficial effects of
mergers.
                                                          
* I would like to thank Natalia Fabra for careful assistance. The paper also benefited
from comments made by the Editor and other members of the editorial board of
Mercato Concorrenza Regole, in particular by Roberto Pardolesi.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo MottaRSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta
1.  INTRODUCTION
This paper summarises the economic analysis of mergers and its policy
implications in a non-technical way. It also offers an economist's view on
the main features of the EC merger policy and suggests some
modifications which would help to to bring it in line with economic
thinking. More specifically, we shall argue here that the EC merger
policy has two main distortions. The first one is that it prohibits only
mergers which create or reinforce dominance, whereas economic analysis
suggests that there exist mergers which are detrimental to welfare even
though they do not bring about dominance. Hence, some mergers are
allowed which should instead be
prohibited. The second distortion is that the EC merger policy does not
recognises the role played by cost savings, which might give rise to
positive welfare effects of mergers. Accordingly, efficiency gains should
explicitly be taken into account, otherwise some mergers are prohibited
which should instead be allowed.
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 summarises
the main economic arguments which should be considered when
assessing mergers. In particular, we shall look first (section 2.1) at the
unilateral effects ofmergers (when firms increase prices after the merger
but without any coordinated behaviour with rivals), and then (section 2.2)
at the pro-collusive effects of mergers (when firms increase prices after
the merger because it facilitates collusion). To deal with the latter topic,
we shall have to analyyse in detail what is collusion and what are the
main factors which allow to sustain it. Section 3 builds upon the previous
theoretical section to briefly discuss the EC merger policy and its main
weaknesses.
2. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MERGERS
This section analyses the main results about the impact of mergers
1
provided by economic theory
2. There are two main cases which should be
considered when studying the effects of mergers. Firstly, the case where
the merger might allow a firm to unilaterally exercise market power and
raise prices. In the US, this amounts to analysing the unilateral effects of
                                                          
1 Note that throughout this article I will use the term "merger" which I use here as a
synonimous of the perhaps more general legal term "concentration". When analysing
the economic effects of a concentration, the distinction between a takeover and a
commonly agreed merger is largely irrelevant.
2 For a formal analysis, see Kühn, K-U. and M. Motta, 1999, "Horizontal Mergers",
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a merger. In the EU, this corresponds to the case of single firm
dominance if the merger creates a firm with sufficiently high market
power that it can profitably increase prices.
The other case arises when a merger might favour collusion in the
industry. Here, the merging firm would not be able to unilaterally raise
prices above a certain threshold, but the merger could determine new
industry conditions which enhance the scope for collusion. Prices could
then increase as firms are more likely to attain a (tacitly or explicitly)
collusive outcome. This issue falls under the category of joint dominance
(or collective dominance; sometimes also oligopolistic dominance) in the
EU and coordinated effects of a merger in the US.
2.1 Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects
To understand why a merger might allow a firm to unilaterally increase
market power, consider a simple example. Imagine that in a given town
there are a few independent grocery stores. Competition constrains the
market power of each store: if one of them tried to increase prices in a
significant way, many among its current consumers would start and do
their shopping at some other store. Anticipating this, the store considering
the price increase will refrain to do so. Its market power, that is its ability
to charge consumers a high mark-up, is therefore limited by the presence
of the rival stores.
Such market power, however, will increase if two or more stores
merged to give rise to a chain of grocery stores. A contemporaneous
increase in the price of each product sold by the merged stores would be
profitable, because the number of rival stores is reduced. Consumers
would have to travel higher distances to find a store with lower prices,
and many of them will shop at their usual store despite higher prices.
In general, therefore, the merger increases (by some degree) market
power of the merging firms, which in turn will increase prices. To be
more precise, there exists a small difference on the predictions about the
price effects of mergers made by different models in the industrial
economics literature. In particular, models which assume that firms'
decision variable is market price predict that both the prices charged by
the merging firms, and by the outsiders would rise; conversely, models
which assume that firms' decision variable is quantity predict that the
merging firms would reduce their outputs (that is, they would raise their
price), whereas the outsiders would increase their outputs (they wouldRSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 5
reduce price)
3. This difference is not important, however, as both models
predict that the overall effect of the merger (in the absence of efficiency
gains) is to reduce consumer surplus
4.
The effect of the merger on the firms is of some interest. In
general, theory predicts that the merger will benefit the insiders, in the
sense that the profit made by the new firm is higher than the sum of the
profit made by the partner firms if the merger had not taken place
5. What
is perhaps more surprising to some readers, though, is that in general the
merger will also benefit the outsiders, that is the independent firms still
operating in the industry. This is because the insiders, by increasing
prices and/or reducing output, push the overall prices in the market up, to
the benefit of the rivals as well. Indeed, the rivals might gain more than
                                                          
3 For papers where firms choose quantities (technically, we say that products are
strategic substitutes) see for instance Salant, Stephen, Sheldon Switzer and Robert
Reynolds, 1983, "Losses from horizontal mergers: the effects of an exogenous change
in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium", Quarterly Journal of Economics
98, 185-199. and Farrell, Joseph and Carl Shapiro, 1990, "Horizontal Mergers: an
Equilibrium Analysis", American Economic Review 80, (1), 107-125. For a paper
where firms choose prices (i.e., products are strategic complements), see Deneckere,
Raymond and Carl Davidson, 1985, "Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand
competition", Rand Journal of Economics 16, 473-486.
4 Even in the models where firms set quantities, the increase in quantities sold by the
outsiders is outweighed by the decrease in the quantities sold by the insiders.
5 There are some theoretical and empirical qualifications to this result. On the
theoretical side, Salant et al. (1983) (cit.) showed that merging firms would lose from
a merger. However, their model depends on a series of strong assumptions which
must contemporaneously be satisfied: (1) firms choose quantities; (2) products should
be very close substitutes; (3) there are no (or very small) efficiency gains from the
merger. Relaxing one of these assumptions is enough to restore insiders' profitability
from the merger. Empirical evidence is not conclusive on whether the merger is
(statistically) profitable for insiders: see, among others, Mueller, Dennis C., 1985,
Profits in the Long-run, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., Ravenscraft, David J. and
Scherer, Frederic M., 1987, "Mergers, sell-offs, and economic efficiency",
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, Caves, Richard E., 1989, "Mergers,
Takeovers and Economic Efficiency. Foresight vs. Hindsight", International Journal
of Industrial Organization, 7, 151-174., Frank, Julian, Harris, Robert S., and Titman,
Sheridan, 1991, "The Postmerger Share-Price Performance of Acquiring Firms",
Journal of Financial Economics; 29(1), 81-96. Several explanations have been
suggested as to why mergers might be on average unprofitable. See Roll, Richard,
1986, "The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers", Journal of Business, 59 (2),
part 1, 197-216., Morck, Randall Andrei Schleifer and Robert Vishny, 1990, "Do
Managerial Incentives Drive Bad Acquisitions?", Journal of Finance, 45 (1), 31-48.
and Fauli-Oller, Ramon and Massimo Motta, 1996, "Managerial Incentives for
Takeovers", Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5(4), 497-514.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 6
the insiders from the merger
6. If there are no efficiency gains which
modify the relative competitiveness of the different firms, therefore, the
merger is beneficial to insiders and outsiders alike, and therefore
unambiguously increase producer surplus.
Therefore, the merger decreases consumer surplus but increases
producer surplus. However, it is possible to show that the net effect on
welfare, defined in the standard way as the sum of consumer surplus and
producer surplus, is negative. In sum, because it increases market power,
mergers hurt consumers and society at large. (Recall that we are
considering here the case where the merger does not result in efficiency
gains).
2.1.1 Variables which Affect Unilateral Market Power
It can be proved that - other things being equal - the larger the number of
independent firms operating after the merger the less likely that it will be
detrimental to consumers. The intuition for this result is straightforward,
as the ability of merging firms to exert market power clearly depends on
the number of rivals. In the case of a merger to monopoly, for instance,
the new firm will not face any restraint in its pricing decision. At the
other extreme, in an industry which is extremely fragmented and in which
each firm possesses only tiny market shares, the impact of a merger on
the market price will be irrelevant. This gives us a rationale for using a
concentration index, like for instance the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI)
7, as a first screening device for unilateral effects of mergers:
Ceteris paribus, we should worry more about a merger in an industry
which is already highly concentrated than about one which occurs in a
fragmented industry.
For the same reasons, and whatever the existing level of
concentration, we want to pay more attention to a merger which increases
in a sensitive way industry concentration than to one which increases it
only marginally. This gives us a rationale for using a proxy for the likely
                                                          
6 A merger can therefore be seen as a sort of "public good" (the public good being
high prices) provided by the insiders, while the outsiders might "free ride" on the
provision of the public good.
7 The HHI is the most standard index of concentration to be found in industrial
organisation and it is the most often used in antitrust analysis. It is given by the sum
of the squares of market shares of the firms in the industry. It can vary between 0,
when the market is entirely fragmented (each firm has a market share close to 0) and
10,000 when there is only one firm in the industry, which has 100% of the market.
(The index takes values between 0 and 1 if fractions instead of percentage values are
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change in concentration (such as ∆ HHI, that is, the difference between
post- and pre-merger concentration) as an additional screening device.
These two indexes are used by the US agencies to screen mergers
and decide which ones are likely to raise adverse competitive
consequences and which ones are not
8.
Another simple but useful indicator of the likely market power
created by the merger is given by market shares (on which the European
Commission usually focuses in reviewing mergers). Farrell and Shapiro
(1990), for instance, show that the lower the market share of the merging
companies the less detrimental the effect on market prices
9. McAfee and
Williams (1992)
10 find that mergers which result in a new largest firm and
mergers which increase the size of the largest firm always reduce welfare.
These findings justify using market shares of the merging firms as
another possible screening device in merger control. If the merger
involves firms with little market shares then it is unlikely that
considerable adverse effects would arise.
Besides current market shares, the analysis of the relative
productive capacity of the firms is very important in determining the
market power enjoyed by the insiders. We have seen that the ability to
raise prices by any given firm is constrained by the existence of rivals to
which consumers can switch. It is therefore crucial that such rivals be
effectively competitive, and in particular be able to satisfy the additional
demand addressed to them. In other words, one has to look at the
distribution of capacities within the industry to make sure that existing
competitors are not already operating at capacity. Imagine for instance a
situation where two merging firms have together only, say, 35% of the
market, but are the only firms in the industry with spare capacity. In this
case, market shares would clearly understate the market power of the
insiders, which can profitably raise prices as outsiders will not be able to
cover - at least in the short run - any additional demand.
                                                          
8 See US Merger Guidelines (1992, sect. 1.5).
9 It might also be possible that a merger between small firms might decrease market
prices even in the absence of efficiency gains. This is because they analyse the case
where firms choose quantities: the outsiders react to the lower quantity of the insiders
by increasing their own output. When the insiders are small firms, their output
reduction might be of a lower order of magnitude than the output expansion of the
large outsider firms.
10 McAfee, Preston, Williams, Michael A., 1992, "Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust
Policy", Journal Industrial Economics, 40(2), 181-187.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 8
For the same reasons, consideration of market shares alone can be
misleading in industries where production depends on the availability of
raw materials or other indispensable inputs. For instance, sellers of
mineral water depend on the water reserves of their sources
11; platinum
producers depend on the reserves contained in their mines
12 and so forth
13.
Availability of such resources must be kept in proper consideration in
order to assess market power, as the Commission correctly recognises
this point in its decisions.
Of course, not only supply variables but also demand variables
must be taken into account to understand to what extent the merging
firms would enjoy market power. For instance, in industries characterised
by very high switching costs, consumers would not easily change their
providers, who will then enjoy market power. More generally, the lower
the elasticity of market demand the higher the scope for raising prices.
The capacity of firms to raise prices after a merger is limited by the
existence of potential entrants in the industry. Firms which would find it
unprofitable to enter the industry at pre-merger prices might decide to
enter if the merger brings about higher prices or lower quantities
14. By
anticipating this effect, post-merger prices might not rise at all; or, if they
do, the price increase would be transitory. The extent to which potential
entrants restrain market power of actual industry participants crucially
depends on fixed sunk costs. The larger (and the more sunk, i.e.
committed to the industry and not recoverable) the costs that an entrant
has to incur the higher the scope for price increase.
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry involves a lot of
difficulties. Antitrust authorities will have to judge whether there are
firms which might consider entry, how likely they are to do so, what are
the possibile barriers
15 they face and how long it might take for entry to
                                                          
11 See Nestlè/Perrier, IV/M.190 [1992], OJ L356.
12 See Gencor/Lonrho.
13 Airtours/First Choice is another case where capacity plays a crucial role.
14 Entry might also take the form of imports from abroad. If after a merger prices rise,
foreign firms' competitiveness increase. As a result, imports might discipline the
market in the same way as local entrants.
15 Barriers to entry can be of very different nature. They might be technological
(know-how to be learned, but also patents might protect the existing firms),
administrative (e.g. when government licenses or permits are needed to operate),
linked to the financial market (firms might have problems in obtaining financing for
the new venture), and so on. In many circumstances, consumer preferences might also
be an obstacle, as when the existing market participants have built brand
consciousness and loyalty throughout the years, and an entrant should invest heavilyRSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 9
be accomplished (the more it takes the higher the damage to consumers
and social welfare). This is recognised by both the EC Commission and
the US Department of Justice (see for instance Merger Guidelines,
section 3).
The merging firms' ability to charge high prices also depends on
the degree of concentration of the buyers. A firm is clearly more free to
exert market power if it faces a large number of dispersed consumers or
buyers than if it faces one or few strong buyers
16. A strong buyer can
make use of its bargaining power to stimulate competition among the
sellers, either by threatening to withdraw orders from one seller to give
them to another, or by threatening to start upstream production itself
17.
Because of coordination problems, entry into the sellers' industry
by new firms can also be easier when buyers are concentrated. Imagine
for instance a situation where the merger creates a monopolistic firm (the
reasoning would be similar if there are few sellers), and that potential
entrants would have to make a considerable sunk investment to be able to
operate in this market. If buyers are dispersed, and potential entrants have
similar cost levels, orders are likely to be distributed across sellers.
Winning orders from a few buyers might not be enough to justify this
investment, and as a result no new firm might enter the industry, even
though each potential entrant is more efficient than the monopolist.
Because buyers are not coordinating in the decision of which seller to
select, they might end up with having the monopolist as only seller in the
industry, and hence face much higher bills than if entry had occurred.
When instead there is just a single buyer (or all the buyers coordinate),
then it will give its order to one of the entrant and this will be able to
enter the industry
18. This argument was used by the Commission in the
ABB/Daimler-Benz case, which was cleared (subject to conditions)
mainly on the grounds that Deutsche Bahn (the German railways
operator), the only buyer for mainline trains, would have exerted
competitive pressure on the producers of trains and railways materials.
                                                                                                                                                                     
in advertising to win the confidence of the consumers. Switching costs of various
nature might also be an important obstacle to new entrants.
16 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 1952, "American Capitalism: The Concept of
Countervailing Power", is probably the first author who has argued that
countervailing power of buyers can considerably restrain the market power of sellers.
17 See Scherer, F.M, and Ross, David, 1990, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, Third Ed. (chapter 14) for a
discussion and a number of examples.
18 For a formal presentation of this argument, see Chiara Fumagalli and Massimo
Motta "Buyers' coordination", mimeo, 1999.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 10
2.1.2 Efficiency Gains
We have seen that in the absence of efficiency gains a merger should be
expected to lower both consumer surplus and total welfare. However, it is
well established in the economic literature that efficiency gains might
offset the enhanced market power of merging firms and result in higher
welfare
19. This is because the merger might cause the insiders to be more
efficient and save on their unit costs. If these savings are large enough,
they will outweigh the increase in market power and result in lower
prices, to the benefit of consumers.
To better illustrate the opposite forces at work, consider again the
example made above, where two or more stores in the same town merge.
We have seen that the merger allows them to exercise market power. In
the absence of efficiency gains, this means that the new chain store would
find it profitable to charge higher prices. But consider now the case where
the merger allows the partner stores to rationalise their activities, better
organise their transportation network, bargain harder with suppliers, save
on the duplication of promotions (such as coupons and special offers sent
to consumers) and so forth. In this case, the merger allows for the chain
store operations to be run more efficiently than before, so that savings in
unit costs will occur.
The new merged firm might of course still increase its prices (its
sales decreasing but its mark-up increasing both because of the price rise
and of the lower costs). This strategy would certainly be profitable
because we have seen it was so even in the absence of any cost saving.
However, it is not necessarily optimal (that is, the most profitable
strategy) any longer. Indeed, because of efficiency gains, another
profitable strategy might now be to reduce prices and attract new
consumers. For instance, in the case where prices and unit costs
decreased proportionally, the unit mark-up would be exactly the same as
before the merger, but total profits would be higher as lower prices
increase the chain store's demand.
In general, therefore, with efficiency gains the merging firms has
two possible ways to increase their profits: to increase prices (reduce
sales), or to decrease prices (increase output). Which of these two ways is
                                                          
19 The first to point out that efficiency gains might offset enhanced market power was
Williamson, Oliver E., 1968, "Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Trade-offs", American Economic Review, 59,954-959. See also Farrell and Shapiro
(1990) for a recent and elegant contribution which emphasises the role of efficiency
gains.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 11
the most profitable cannot be said a priori, but the higher the efficiency
gains the more likely the second effect dominates. If efficiency gains are
large enough then the insiders to the merger will decrease sales price and
both consumer and total welfare will increase.
It should be noted that the impact of merger on the distribution of
firms' profits might be very different when there are efficiency gains.
Indeed, outsiders might lose from the merger, and thus oppose to it, when
the merger allows insiders to cut their costs: intuitively, this is because
the merger changes the competitivity of the firms in the industry, to the
detriment of the outsiders.
The Nature of Efficiency Gains, and their Assessment.
Sofar, we have been rather vague about the sources of possible efficiency
gains. There are several reasons why firms which combine their assets
might decrease their costs. The most obvious are the existence of
economies of scale and economies of scope. Due to a merger, firms might
be able to reorganise their production so as to improve division of labour
and attain economies of scale; or they might benefit from lower costs due
to joint production. Other possible gains might come from synergies in
research and development, rationalisation of distribution and marketing
activities, cost savings in administration
20.
From the theoretical point of view, one would like to draw a
distinction between cost savings that will directly affect variable
production costs, such as economies of scale and economies of scope, and
cost savings that mainly affect fixed costs. The former type of efficiency
gains is likely to have a direct impact on prices, while the latter type
would affect fixed (i.e. independent of the volume of production) costs
and thus would not modify the price decisions of the firms (which only
depend on variable costs). Efficiency gains might still lead to a positive
welfare effect of the merger, but this would only come from an increase
in profits due to lower duplication of fixed costs, since consumer surplus
would not change. If competition agencies attach a higher weight to
                                                          
20 Another possible efficiency argument is that takeovers might improve efficiency
via the substitution of less able managers with more successful ones. However,
empirical works do not seem to give strong support this "managerial discipline"
theory. See McGuckin, Robert and Sang Nguyen, 1995, "On the productivity and
plant ownership change: new evidence from the longitudinal research database", Rand
Journal of Economics, 26 (2), 257-76, Matsusaka, John G., 1993, "Takeover motives
during conglomerate merger wave", Rand Journal of Economics, 24 (3), 357-79, and
Kim, Han and Vijay Singal, 1993, "Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the
Airline Industry", American Economic Review, 83 (3), 549-69.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 12
consumer welfare, or competition laws require that some of the firms'
gains should pass on to consumers, then efficiency gains which are
mainly due to savings on fixed costs should be looked at less favourably.
The US Merger Guidelines come to a similar conclusion, although
for different reasons, that is, because efficiencies derived from technical
rationalisation are easier to demonstrate than efficiencies obtained in the
reduction of administrative costs, personnel savings and other fixed
outlays
21.
Next, efficiency arguments should be accepted only as long as
costs savings achieved by the merger could not be achieved otherwise. If,
for instance, the firms claimed that the merger would create efficiency
gains because it would reduce personnel cost, one should really wonder if
such cuts in personnel could not be done even without a merger. If not,
efficiency gains are not merger specific and they should not be accepted
as an efficiency defence of the merger, as they could be obtained without
allowing a potentially anticompetitive operation like the merger.
Finally, a crucial issue in the discussion of efficiency gains is the
assessment of the likelihood of the gains from a merger. There is in
general asymmetric information between a competition agency and the
merging partners: the latter are clearly more informed about the structure
of production and the functioning of the market than the former. When
efficiency gains are a crucial determinant in an agency's decision on the
prohibition or acceptance of the merger, it is clear that the merging
partners have an incentive to overstate efficiency claims
22. On the other
hand, and for opposite reasons, the rival firms which fear the merger
could jeopardise their competitive positions might have an incentive to
understate the efficiency gains of a merger
23. Agencies will therefore
want to rely on independent studies to try and evaluate efficiency
considerations
24.
                                                          
21 U.S. DoJ and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, revised April 8, 1997, section 4.
22 Merging partners often have a genuine tendency to overstate the benefits from
combining their activities and assets. Agencies should be aware that even strictly
internal and confidential documents might report too optimistic an assessment of the
merger efficiency gains.
23 Reading the decisions taken by the Commission, I have the - admittedly subjective -
impression that it is often sympathetic to the views expressed by outsiders. Yet, rivals
are likely to complain when the merger gives efficiency gains to the merging parties,
and this is precisely the only situation where the merger might have positive welfare
effects.
24 Neven, Damien, Robin Nuttall and Paul Seabright, 1993, "Merger in daylight: The
economics and politics of European merger control", London: Centre for EconomicsRSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 13
2.2 Horizontal Mergers: Pro-collusive Effects
Sofar we have considered just one of the possible mechanisms through
which a merger can negatively affect welfare, namely the case of
unilateral market power. A second important mechanism is given by pro-
collusive effects, where the merger does not pose a threat of market
power by a single firm, but can create changes in the industry which
increase the scope for collusion. In other words, before a merger firms
might not be able to reach a collusive outcome, whereas the merger might
create the structural conditions for the firms to (tacitly or explicitly) attain
a collusive outcome. The concept of joint dominance in the EU refers to
this situation.
There are two main reasons why a merger might favour the
creation of collusive outcomes. Firstly, a merger by definition reduces the
number of independent firms. Since it is possible to show (see below) that
the lower the number of market participants the higher the scope for
collusion in the industry, the merger makes it more likely for higher
prices to arise. Secondly, a merger might give rise to a more symmetric
distribution of assets. Both theorists and practitioners tend to agree that a
more equal distribution of assets in the industry facilitates collusion.
Therefore, whenever the effect of the merger is to increase symmetry
among the firms, it will also increase the scope for collusion.
The extent to which collusion (that is, joint dominance) might
occur after the merger depends on a series of factors (among others,
transparency of prices, existence of exchange of information among
firms, frequency of market interactions). The more an industry is already
characterised by the co-existence of factors which favour a collusive
outcome the more risky to allow for a merger, as it would further increase
the likelihood of collusion.
The analysis of joint dominance will therefore have to take into
account all such factors. It is clear that it is very difficult a priori to
predict whether a merger might lead to joint dominance or not, but the
more the industry contains elements which are likely to favour collusion
the stricter the competition agencies should be towards the merger
25.
                                                                                                                                                                     
Policy Research, suggest that the Commission should create a unit of auditors within
the Merger Task Force, specialising in assessing the likelihood of efficiency gains.
25 What happens if collusion (or a strong suspicion of it) already exists in the
industry? One might then argue that the merger would not change much and therefore
should be allowed. But this would not take into account that a cartel, or tacit
collusion, has always some probability to break down (because of sudden downturnsRSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 14
In what follows, I review the main features of collusion, and briefly
summarise the main factors which affect it.
2.2.1 What are the main features of collusion?
An economist would define collusion as a situation where firms set prices
which are close or equal to monopoly prices
26. Notice that this defines
collusion as an outcome (high price), and not as the specific form through
which that outcome is attained (it could be through an organised cartel, or
non-cooperative behaviour).
For collusion to arise, two elements must exist. Firstly, there must
be the possibility to detect deviations from a certain collusive action
27 in a
timely way. Secondly, there must be a credible punishment which follows
a deviation. Note that a punishment should be thought of as a more
aggressive market behaviour, and not as a direct monetary punishment.
Note also that generally a punishment also hits the punishing firms, and
not just the deviating firm, precisely because it has to rely on market
mechanisms (a low price affects all the firms' profits).
For instance, imagine a cartel, that is a situation of explicit
collusion, where firms agree on certain quotas of production. A deviation
there would take the form of a firm producing more than the quota
assigned to it, with consequent reduction in the market price and
departure from the collusive outcome. It is crucial for the cartel to survive
that its participants detect in a timely way that a deviation has occurred
28,
and even better, which firm has actually deviated (so that the punishment
might be made more costly for the deviant firm). But identifying the
deviation is not enough: there must also be a punishment, which might
take the form of producing much higher quantities (or selling at much
lower prices) in the periods after the deviation. Only if a firm knows both
that a deviation will be identified quickly and that immediately after the
                                                                                                                                                                     
in demand, technological shocks or other changes). If a merger and the consequent
reduction in the number of firms is allowed, then the probability that the cartel breaks
down would be lower.
26 Monopoly, or joint-maximisation prices, are the prices which would be set if all the
firms in the industry were affiliates of the same company, or where managed by the
same manager. An alternative definition is that prices are higher than some
benchmark, such as the equilibrium prices of a game where firms meet only once in
the marketplace (a situation where collusion would not arise).
27 Examples of collusive actions are high price or low output; deviations take then the
form of respectively price undercutting or larger quantity brought to the market.
28 This is not necessarily easy: a fall in the quantity demanded to an individual firm
might also be due to a negative shock in demand.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 15
deviation it will have to forego enough profits because of the market
reaction of the cartel members, will it refrain from deviating and will it
continue to sell the agreed upon quota, so that the collusive outcome will
arise.
A collusive outcome can arise, under precisely the same
conditions, even if explicit collusion does not exist and firms behave non-
cooperatively, that is they do not talk to each other to arrive at an
agreement. Suppose for instance that there are two foodstalls in the
market, they both sell pears of identical quality, and they are located in
front of each other. Imagine that sellers pay 1$ per kilo to their suppliers.
When seller A arrives in the morning at the market, he can see that the
rival sells pears at, say, 2$ per kilo, which we can think of as the
monopoly price. When deciding his own price, he can either set the same
price (that would be the collusive strategy) or he could deviate from it
and set a lower price. He certainly understands that if he sets the price at,
say, 1.9$, he will get more customers than the rival, and that for the time
the price difference will last, he will get higher profits than if he
``colluded" (he will make a "gain from the deviation"). However, he also
knows that detection of a deviation is immediate in this situation, and he
knows that the rival will react to such a deviation by ``punishing" him,
setting a price lower or equal to 1.9. At best, both will charge 1.9$, so that
both will end up by having lower profits than if they had both sold at 2$.
But the rival might decide to give a harsher punishment, for instance
setting a price close to 1$ to make it clear that she would not like
``deviations", thus causing a much higher ``loss from the deviation".
Therefore, the expectation of the punishment (or of a price war) will
make seller A quite willing to charge the monopoly price. Collusive
prices will arise through non-cooperative behaviour of the sellers.
The modern analysis of collusion in industrial economics is all
based on the concept that when firms decide price or output, they
compare the immediate gain they make from a deviation with the future
loss they will have as soon as the rivals react. This is a simple and
powerful concept. Even if each firm behaves in a non-cooperative way,
and just pursues its self-interest, collusion might arise. This is more likely
to be so the lower the profit that a firm would obtain from deviating, the
lower the expected profits it would make once the punishment starts, the
less weight firms attach to the future (which is when the ``loss from
deviation" occurs).RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 16
Notice that the example above stresses the fact that sellers do not
need to talk, let alone agree on complicated schemes, to attain a collusive
outcome. All is needed is the awareness that a deviation will be
identified, and that a ``punishment" will follow.
A (good) economist, however, would not suggest that one should
only look at market outcomes to decide whether there has been an
infringement of antitrust law, for several reasons. First of all, it is often
not clear what a monopoly price in an industry would be
29. In the above
example, sellers might have different views of what that price would be,
and an outside observer even different perceptions. Similar divergences
might arise when deciding which prices are high enough to be judged
``too high" and therefore collusive. These judgments always imply a high
degree of arbitrariness, and thus should be avoided. Not to add that if we
started to convict firms only on the grounds that they charge higher
prices, then we would open the way for antitrust interventions whenever a
firm is successful enough to find consumers willing to pay high prices for
its products.
Further, going back to our example, should we make seller A guilty
of collusion just because he has acted in the pursuing of higher profits?
After all, he has just tried to do what any honest enterpreneur would do,
that is to have the highest possible gains from his activity, without
coordinating his decisions with his rival.
Even the fact that sellers charge the same prices constantly over
time (the so-called ``price parallelism") is not enough to establish they are
guilty of collusion. Common exogenous shocks such as the increase in
intermediate prices of all the suppliers, or an increase in inflation, or an
increase in property prices would probably lead all the sellers to increase
prices proportionally, but one should not infer from this that they are
colluding.
For all these reasons, inferring illegal collusive behaviour - i.e.,
inferring conspiracy in the US or infringement of article 81 in the EU -
from market data (that is, only looking at the outcomes) would not be
desirable, and the legal approach which requests some hard evidence as
necessary to convict firms for collusion is certainly correct
30.
                                                          
29 See the Microsoft case for interesting discussions about what a monopoly price
would be in that industry.
30 On these points, see Kai-Uwe Kühn (1998), "Collusion and exchange of
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To repeat, the main contribution of the modern industrial
economics literature, based on game theory, is twofold: first, there are
two essential features for (tacit or explicit) collusive outcomes to arise:
detection and punishment of deviations. Second, there is no need for an
explicit agreement
for the collusive outcome to arise: firms can set collusive prices even if
they behave non-cooperatively, and just because they expect that by not
doing so, rivals would react by ``punishing" them, which would result in
lower profits.
This literature, which focuses on the extent to which deviations can
be observed and on the comparison between gains and losses from
deviations, allows to identify the main factors which affect the likelihood
of collusion, whose analysis we now turn to
31.
2.2.2 Factors which Facilitate Collusion
Concentration
Collusion is the more likely the smaller the number of firms in the
industry
32,
or the higher the degree of concentration. The comparison between gains
and losses from deviations illustrates why this the case
33. Imagine that
there are many firms of identical size which coexist in the industry. At a
collusive situation, each of them will get a (small) share of the total
profits. However, a deviation might allow them to get all the market for
themselves. Even if the punishment was harsh, so that a very small stream
of expected profits would follow after a deviation, the gains from
deviating would be so extraordinarily large in the deviation period that
they would outweigh the collusive profits foregone during the
punishment period. Compare this situation with one where there are only
two firms in the industry. At a collusive equilibrium, they would get half
the market, so that the gains from deviating are smaller relative to the
lower profits due to the punishment which follows.
Therefore, the more concentrated the market the easier for the
firms to attain a (tacitly or explicitly) collusive outcome.
                                                          
31 For a formal industrial organisation analysis of collusion, see the classical text by
Tirole, Jean. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, Mass: The
MIT Press.
32 We refer here to the firms which have a non-marginal market share.
33 It is intuitive that the more agents there are the more difficult for them to reach a
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Price Transparency
Detection of deviations is a crucial ingredient for collusion. If prices (or
price discounts) are not observable, then collusion would be more
difficult to sustain. Imagine for instance a situation where a seller could
not observe the prices charged by rivals. Then, he would not know if a
number of customers served lower than expected is due to a negative
shock in demand (assume also that he cannot observe overall market
demand levels with precision) or to a price reduction by a rival which has
stolen some of his business. As a result, he might start a punishment
phase even if nobody has deviated, making collusion less stable
34.
It is then clear that exchange of information on past prices and
quantities (or verifiable information on prices and quantities set in the
current period) of each individual firm facilitates collusion, as it allows
firms to detect immediately deviations and to punish when needed. In the
absence of disaggregate information on prices and quantities, availability
of more precise estimates of aggregate (market) demand would also help,
as it allows
firms to see whether a decrease in individual demand is due to cheating of
rivals or to a negative shock in market demand. In turn, this implies that
there is no need of punishment phases which are triggered not by
deviations but by a general decrease of market demand
35.
Announcement of future prices might also help collusion, but here
we should distinguish two different situations: (1) announcements
directed to competitors only; (2) announcements with commitment value
to consumers. The first case deals with exchange between firms of
intentions about which prices to charge. This might help them to
coordinate on the particular collusive price which is most convenient to
all of them, and therefore helps collusion
36. In the second case, price
announcements are public but are mainly addressed to consumers. On the
one hand, transparency of prices still helps collusion, for the reasons
indicated above. On the other hand, though, market transparency is good
for consumers, as it allows them to ``shop around" for the best offer. The
                                                          
34 Green, E.J. and Porter, R.H. 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect
Competition". Econometrica, Vol. 52, pp. 87-100, show that, in these circumstances,
to cut his price would indeed be optimal: If rivals knew he does not cut prices after
observing lower demand they would not refrain from deviating.
35 On collusion and exchange of information between competitors, see Kai-Uwe Kühn
and Xavier Vives (1995).
36 Unilateral announcements help players to select a jointly optimal price, which
otherwise it would be difficult to coordinate on if a focal price (that is, an obvious
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latter positive effect is generally considered of a first-order magnitude
with respect to the collusive effects of the announcements. There exists
consensus - based both on theoretical arguments and empirical evidence -
that price advertising in this sense is generally beneficial and brings
prices down
37. Therefore, when prices are ``transparent" for both
consumers and firms, this should not be considered as a factor facilitating
collusion.
Characteristics of Demand, and its Evolution
First, it is easy to see that small, regular orders facilitate collusion.
Indeed, an unusually large order would give a very strong temptation to
deviate: by deviating, a firm would make unusually large profit, and the
perspective of losing collusive profits obtained under the typically small
expected demand is not enough to deter the deviation. The frequency of
the orders also helps collusion because it allows for a timely punishment.
If orders arrive only at very large distance between them, one can have a
higher incentive to deviate because the punishment period will be started
only much later in the future.
The impact of demand evolution over time upon collusion is a
more difficult subject, as it depends on whether changes are expected or
not and which types of shocks demand has. Suppose for instance that
firms know they are in a period of boom which is unlikely to continue in
the future
38. Then, everything is as if a very large order suddenly arrived,
and the analysis would be as above: firms would break from collusion to
capture the profit of unusually large demand.
Collusion is less likely to arise also when firms face a future of
declining market demand, for similar reasons. They would find it better to
deviate and get high profits today (and being punished tomorrow when
the market is smaller) than to have their collusive share of profits which
are declining over time.
                                                          
37 For a survey of both the theoretical and the empirical literature on price advertising,
see Chiara Fumagalli and Massimo Motta (1999), "Advertising restrictions in
professional services", presented at the Conference on "Anticompetitive effects of
regulation", EUI, Florence, September 1999; a slightly different version has been
published in Italian: "Restrizioni alla pubblicità nelle libere professioni", Mercato
Concorrenza Regole, n.3, December 1999, pp. 421-445.
38 This is the case dealt with formally by Rotemberg, J.J. and Saloner, G. 1986. "A
Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms." American Economic
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Imagine instead that firms expect that demand would increase
steadily and considerably in the future. In this case, collusion is more
likely: Why should a firm give up the prospect of large future collusive
profits for a small gain today, when the market is still small?
Against this background, we can conclude that a stagnant demand
is neither facilitating nor aggravating the possibility of collusion.
Product Homogeneity
The Commission and the ECJ (as well as practitioners) have always
attached a high importance to the features of the goods sold by the firms
in Art. 81 or joint dominance cases. It is maintained that it is easier to
reach collusion with homogenous than differentiated products. Theory is
less clear about this point. Suppose that products are differentiated
39. In
this case, it is harder to punish a deviant firm, since even a considerable
reduction in prices by rivals would leave the deviant firm with a positive
demand. This effect tends to favour collusion, as only the fear of
punishment makes firms refrain from deviating. However, for precisely
the same reasons, under differentiated products, a deviation is less
profitable too: a deviant firm cannot expect to gain very large market
shares from rivals unless it makes a very considerable cut in prices.
Therefore, product homogeneity does not unambiguously raise the scope
for collusion
40. A priori, it is not clear that - other things being equal -
collusion should be more likely in products like cement and gasoline
than, say, cigarettes, colas or mineral waters, which are all consumer
goods characterised by a high degree of consumer loyalty
41.
Possibly, however, what the Commission really thinks of when
suggesting that homogeneity helps collusion is that if firms sold not a
single well-defined product but very many different product variants, then
it would be more difficult for them to attain a collusive outcome. This
makes sense, insofar as it reduces the visibility of deviations, and would
thus diminish the
                                                          
39 One can think of this situation as one where each firm has a proportion of
customers who are very loyal and therefore will continue to buy despite price
reductions in competing products.
40 See for instance Ross (1992), International Journal of Industrial Organization, for a
formal analysis.
41 The large advertising expenditures sustained in these markets explain why these
products are perceived by consumers as very differentiated from each other. See the
pathbreaking work of Sutton, John, 1991, "Sunk costs and market structure: Price
competition, advertising, and the evolution of concentration", Cambridge, Mass. and
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possibility to resort to quick punishments
42.
Symmetry
Competition authorities and courts regard symmetry among firms as a
factor which facilitates collusion. Symmetry can concern different
dimensions (such as market shares, number of varieties in the product
portfolio, costs and technological knowledge, capacities), whose
importance will clearly differ across industries. Many informal arguments
exist which support the idea that symmetry helps collusion: for instance,
it is intuitive that people who are in a similar position would find it easier
to arrive at an agreement which suits all of them. Recently, there have
been some formal contributions to the literature which give further
support to this idea
43. Consider the following example. There exist two
firms, one with 70% and the other with 30% market share. The larger
firm will find it less interesting to deviate: to capture a (relatively) small
additional market share, it would have to reduce its price, but by doing so
it would decrease its margins on all the large market share it has already.
Therefore, deviating from a collusive outcome would certainly be less
attractive than for its rival, which can hope to attract a relatively much
larger share of the market by decreasing its prices. The large firm is less
keen on punishing after a deviation, too. This is because when both firms
set low prices the large firm will be more hit than the small one, as it
foregoes larger profits. The small firm knows that after a deviation the
punishment will not be as harsh as it could be, and will be less deterred
from deviating
44.
Therefore, asymmetry introduces some difficulties for collusion. If
firms' positions were more similar, their incentives to deviate and to
                                                          
42 In Airtours/First Choice, for instance, the fact that each agency sells package tours
which are extremely differentiated (by destination, category of hotel, number of days
of stay, accessory services and so on) is not by itself preventing the collusive outcome
to arise. After all, catalogues containing the offers of rivals are easily accessible, and
prices quoted can be compared. However, it is crucial for this reasoning that agencies
are not able to make selective secret discounts, which would lower visibility of
deviations much reduced.
43 See Compte, Olivier, Frederic Jenny and Patrick Rey, 1996, "Capacity Constraints,
Mergers and Collusion", mimeo, Universite de Toulouse, and Kühn, Kai-Uwe and
Motta, Massimo, 1999, "The Economics of Joint Dominance", mimeo, University of
Michigan.
44 This example is inspired to Kühn and Motta (1999) (cit.). In Compte et al. (1997)
(cit.), where firms differ in capacities, it is the largest firm which has more incentive
to deviate and the smallest firm whose punishment threat is less credible. Despite the
different mechanism, though, the result that symmetry helps collusion still holds.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 22
punish would be more aligned and collusion could be more easily
sustained.
Analysis of Collusion: Conclusions.
The above analysis has identified the main factors which affect the
likelihood of collusion. In a merger case which raises doubts of
coordinated effects (joint dominance), it is important to assess correctly
the role played by each variable in the determining the likelihood of
future collusion in the industry. The analysis will often be very complex.
Apart from the cases where all factors point towards the same direction,
in general we should expect that the analysis of these factors will leave
some space for discretion, as is difficult to understand how such factors
interact and whether collusion is likely to arise from the merger or not
45.
2.2.3 Pro-collusive Effects: Other Variables to Consider
In what follows, we briefly look at how other considerations, such as
efficiency gains, potential entry and the existence of buyers' power affect
the analysis of mergers when coordinated effects are to be dealt with.
Efficiency Gains
The effect of efficiency gains in joint dominance analysis is slightly less
clearcut than in single firm dominance. In general, an improvement of the
efficiency of operations should be looked at very positively as it should
decrease prices, other things being equal. This is more so when the
merger results in a firm which has lower costs, or a larger capacity, than
the rivals, as these elements might disrupt collusion since they create a
stronger incentive to deviate. It might be conceivable, however, that the
merger and its efficiency gains create symmetric conditions in the
industry. Think for instance of a situation where the second and third
largest firm merge and reach the same product range and technological
level as the industry's leader. It is possible that this might favour collusion
by creating a more symmetric environment. However, it is unlikely that
this effect might outweigh the potential welfare benefits of the efficiency
gains. In particular, by not allowing such a merger, there is the risk that
the gap with respect to the leading (more competitive) firm would worsen
and in the long-run this could result in single-firm dominance. In general,
therefore, efficiency gains should be seen as an effect of a larger order of
magnitude.
                                                          
45 A similar point is also made by Simon B. Bishop, "Power and Responsibility: The
ECJ's Kali-Salz Judgment", [1999], ECLR, Issue 1, pp.38-39.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 23
Entry
As in the case of unilateral market power, the existence of potential
entrants affects negatively the capacity of the incumbent firms to raise
prices through coordinated effects. The likelihood that the merger creates
joint dominance is lower when there are firms which are ready to commit
resources and enter the industry in response of an increase in prices.
Buyers' Power
Most of the considerations we made about the role of buyer power in the
unilateral effects case still hold when coordinated effects are considered.
An additional element we have not considered above and which affects
the extent to which collusion is possible after a merger is the frequency
and the reduced size of the orders. By concentrating its orders, a powerful
buyer can extract better conditions from suppliers which would be more
willing to offer price reductions (and therefore deviate from a collusive
strategy) if the size of the contract is large enough. If instead buyers are
small, each order would be small and the sellers would be less likely to
undercut each other
46.
3 EC MERGER POLICY
In this section we briefly review the EC merger policy in the light of the
economic analysis carried out in the previous sections.
3.1 Single-firm Dominance
Economic analysis suggests a distinction should be made between cases
where the merger raises concerns of unilateral price increase and cases
where the merger raises concerns of (tacit or explicit) collusive
behaviour. In the latter cases, if concerns are justified the merger is said
to create joint dominance. However, the former cases do not correspond
closely with the concept of single firm dominance. To understand this,
consider a situation where two or more firms with relevant market shares
would be left in the industry after a merger, but none of them has enough
market power to be considered dominant, and it is also very unlikely that
they would collude (i.e., they are not jointly dominant). In such a
situation, economic theory clearly indicates that the merger might be
detrimental even in the absence of dominance
47. Yet, the EC policy of
merger control would not prohibit such a merger. Indeed, the EC Merger
                                                          
46 See Snyder, Christofer M., 1996, "A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power",
Rand Journal of Economics, 27(4), 747-769.
47 More precisely, welfare will decrease in the absence of efficiency gains from the
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Regulation 4064/89 (art. 2(3)) establishes that ``A concentration which
creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective
competition would be significantly impeded in the Common Market or in
a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the Common
Market". Therefore, it is not enough to show that a merger has adverse
consequences on competition or that it would increase prices, to block it:
under the Merger Regulation, the finding of a dominant position
48 is a
necessary condition for prohibiting a merger.
There exists therefore a large distortion in the EC merger control:
all mergers which allow firms to raise prices but do not create or
reinforce dominant positions cannot be prohibited
49.
However, there is another distortion in the EC merger policy which
might go in the opposite direction, that is to prohibit mergers which might
be welfare enhancing. This distorsion comes from the lack of efficiency
gains considerations. To this issue we turn next.
3.1.1 The Commission's Approach to Efficiency Gains
Economic analysis suggests that competition agencies which scrutinise
mergers should carefully assess the likely efficiency gains of a merger.
However difficult a task, they should try and estimate whether these
efficiency gains are likely or not to offset the higher market power
enjoyed by the merging firms. This is precisely the approach indicated by
the US Department of Justice, which
"[...] will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character
and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any
relevant market. To make the requisite determination, the Agency considers
whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the
merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g. by
preventing price increases in that market. In conducting this analysis, the
Agency will not simply compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies
with the magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the efficiencies.
The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger [...] the
greater must be cognizable efficiencies in order for the Agency to conclude
                                                          
48 A dominant firm has been defined by the ECJ has a firm which "can determine its
policies substantially free from competitive restraint, that is, is free to act without
taking into account, to any substantial extent, its competitors, purchasers or suppliers"
237-8, United Brands v. Commission, ECR [1978-2], Decision of the Court:
14.02.1978. In economic terms, this would be a firm which is not necessarily a
monopolist, but has very large market power.
49 See also Valentine Korah, "Gencor v. Commission: Collective Dominance", [1999]
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that the merger will not have an anticompetitive effect in any relevant market.
When the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger is likely to be
particularly large, extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies would be
necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive" (US Merger
Guidelines, revised April 8, 1997, section 4).
The EC Commission has a more ambiguous approach towards efficiency
gains. By looking at the wording of the Merger Regulation No. 4064/89
one cannot say that an efficiency defence is explicitly allowed, but neither
that this is ruled out. Art 1.1(b) says that in its appraisal of the merger, the
Commission shall take into account, among other things "[...] the interests
of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of
technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers'
advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition".
Jacquemin
50 argues that the phrasing means that efficiency gains
can be taken into account only in so far as the merger does not form an
obstacle to competition. In other words, he excludes that an efficiency
defence can be used in EC merger control.
The legislative history of the Merger Regulation has sometimes
been mentioned as supporting the view that there exists no efficiency
defence in the EC competition law. This is because in a previous draft of
the Regulation a sentence which would have allowed for some efficiency
defence has been suppressed from the final text, allegedly showing
explicit intention of the legislators not to allow for such a defence.
However, the legislators wanted in our opinion to exclude not an
efficiency defence argument in general, but rather the possibility that it
could be used to support industrial policy arguments. Some countries,
such as France, wanted to allow mergers which could have created
``national champions". This view was successfully opposed by countries
such as the UK and Germany, which wanted to rule out the possibility
that anticompetitive mergers could have been approved on the grounds
that they could have strengthened European firms in the international
marketplace
51. Therefore, what the "travaux préparatoirs" of the Merger
Regulation show is that social, political and industrial policy arguments
may not be used in the assessment of mergers. Since efficiency gains are
a key aspect in determining the economic welfare impact of mergers, we
                                                          
50 Jacquemin, Alexis, 1990, "Mergers and European Policy", in Admiraal, P.H. (ed.)
1990, Merger and Competition Policy in the European Community, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford, p.36.
51 See Noël, Pierre-Emanuele,1997, "Efficiency considerations in the assessment of
mergers", 8, European Competition Law Review, 498-519 (see p. 503) and Goyder,
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can see no contradiction between the spirit of the legislators and the use
of an efficiency defence.
Sofar, the EC Commission in its decisions has not explicitly ruled
out the possibility of using an efficiency defence, but nor has it showed
much sympathy for such an argument
52. Whenever cost reductions have
been claimed by the merging parties, the Commission has dismissed
those claims on various grounds
53. The most interesting decision in this
respect is Aérospatiale-Alenia/DeHavilland, where the Commission
argued that the cost savings would have been negligible, had not been
properly quantified, were not merger-specific (they could have been
attained without the need of a concentration) and would have not gone in
any case to consumers' advantage
54.
Economic analysis therefore strongly recommends that the EC
Commission analyse efficiency gains in depth, and recognise explicitly
the key role played by cost reductions in determining the net welfare
effect of mergers. Otherwise, all the merger policy would be distorted and
would not respond to the objective of increasing either consumer welfare
or overall economic efficiency. Consider the hypotethical case where two
firms wanted to merge. They do not have any rival in the market and they
are going to be a monopolist. For the sake of the argument, suppose also
that the merger would entail so large and verifiable efficiency gains that,
however cautious the estimates of the pricing behaviour of the firms,
consumers would benefit from lower post-merger prices. This is a merger
which would benefit consumers, but the failure to consider efficiency
considerations, and the fact that it would create a dominant firm, will
imply that this operation should be prohibited by the EU authorities
55.
                                                          
52 The Commission used possible cost reductions as an argument against the merger
in at least one case. See AT&T/NCR, Case IV/M.050 (18 January 1991). See also
Noël (1997, p. 512) and Neven, Nuttall and Seabright (1993, p.62). However, this was
one of the early cases in the EC merger control, and it is extremely unlikely that the
Commission would use the same argument today. An efficiency offence argument is
compatible with the objective of "protecting competitors" rather than of "protecting
competition" and therefore should be dismissed from merger control.
53 See Noël (1997, pp 512-514) (cit.). Among the cases where the defendants have
raised efficiency considerations are: Aérospatiale-Alenia/De Havilland, Accor/
Wagon-Lits, MSG/Media Services, Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer.
54 Case IV/M.053 (October 2, 1991), OJ L334/42, 1991, at 65.
55 To make our argument stronger and clearer, we are condidering in this example a
very extreme case of merger, which increases total welfare because it increases both
consumer surplus and producer surplus. But a merger might increase total welfare
even in the case where consumer surplus decreases, provided that the increase in
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It has been observed that the Commission is aware of the
importance of efficiency gains and that it takes them into account in an
implicit manner, for instance by defining the market in a broader way so
that dominance would not be found
56. However, for the sake of
transparency, it would be desirable to deal explicitly with efficiency
gains. As we have argued above, the Commission could consider
efficiency gains in merger control within the current Merger Regulation.
3.1.2 Unilateral Effects: Conclusions
To sum up, the EC Merger Regulation is a source of rather inefficient
biases in the treatment of unilateral effects of mergers. On the one hand,
restricting attention to mergers which create dominance implies that some
welfare detrimental mergers might be approved. On the other hand,
failure to account for efficiency considerations will result in beneficial
mergers being blocked by the EU authorities.
3.2. Joint Dominance
The concept of joint dominance matches closely the concept of
coordinated effects. It has been disputed for a long period whether the
Commission could have extended the concept of dominance to deal with
a situation where dominance was jointly held by two (or more) firms. The
first case where the Commission used joint dominance was in
Nestlè/Perrier, in the French mineral water industry. The merger project
was authorised with conditions, but the issue of joint dominance in the
Nestlè-Perrier case was never brought to Court. This opened a period of
uncertainty with respect to the possibility of applying the Merger
Regulation to collective dominance.
It has been only in France v. Commission
57 that the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the case of joint dominance was covered by the
Merger Regulation, despite the contrary opinion of the Advocate General.
The Court then quashed the Commission's decision on the merit. Indeed,
this judgment seemed to set a high standard of proof for the Commission
                                                                                                                                                                     
be however less straightforward if one takes into account that some regulators tend to
give a larger weight to consumers than firms (profits) in antitrust enforcement.
56 See Peter Camesasca, "The explicit efficiency defence in merger control: Does it
make the difference?", [1999], ECLR, Issue 1, pp.25-27. He suggests the Commission
might do so in order to avoid being accused of using industrial policy arguments if it
explicitly recognised efficiency gains.
57 C-68/94 and C-30/95, 31 March, [1998] ECR I-1375, appeal from Kali und
Salz/MdK/Treuhand, 14.12.93, IV-M.308 [1994], OJ L186/38.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 28
to establish joint dominance, the Court having ruled that joint dominance
would arise when firms "in particular because of correlative factors which
exist between them, are able to adopt a common policy on the market and
act to a considerable extent independently of their competitors, their
customers, and also of consumers"
58. The reference to "correlative
factors" seemed to indicate that the existence of some sort of structural
links among firms was needed to prove joint dominance.
In Gencor v. Commission
59 the Court of First Instance (CFI) has
reaffirmed the principle that the European Commission can block
mergers if they create joint dominance. The CFI has also clarified that
there is no need for oligopolists to be interrelated by some specific links
in order to prove that collective dominance exists. This ruling offers a
broader interpretation of joint dominance, whereas the previous France v.
Commission judgment had been interpreted by some commentators as
requiring much higher standards of proof
60.
The Commission has been ready to use the higher degree of
freedom left by the CFI judgment. In the recent Airtours/First Choice
case
61, the Commission has applied the concept of joint dominance to an
industry whose features are considerably different than those which
characterised industries involved in previous cases of collective
dominance. In particular, the industry is characterised by a large amount
of product heterogeneity and by a high variability of market shares over
time. It is also unclear whether there are serious barriers to entry in the
industry. Further, it has argued that collusion after the merger would take
the form of reduction in capacities, rather than the usual reduction in
prices (the Commission recognised that full collusion on prices was
hardly sustainable in the industry). This argument can be supported by
economic analysis but it witnesses of a step forward by the Commission,
which departed from the standard arguments made sofar in joint dominant
analysis
62.
                                                          
58 See France v. Commission, para. 221.
59 T-102/96, 25 March, [1999] 4 CMLR 971, appeal from Gencor/Lonhro, 24.06.96,
IV/M.619, [1997], OJ L11/30.
60 See Johan Ysewyn and Cristina Caffarra, "Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: The
Future of Collective Dominance After the Kali&Salz Judgment", [1998], ECLR, Issue
7, p.470.
61 22.09.99, IV-M.1524.
62 For a detailed discussion of the Airtours case, see Massimo Motta, "EC Merger
Policy and the Airtours case", mimeo, European University Institute, December 1999.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 29
Overall, the features of the industry are not such that joint
dominance is uncontroversial. Both the arguments made by the
Commission and by the defence counsel make sense, the industry
presenting some features favourable to collusion and others less
favourable to it. This is a borderline case for joint dominance, and it will
be interesting to see whether the Court will uphold the Commission's
decision.
This decision is interesting because it shows that the Commission
might try to rely on joint dominance to prohibit mergers which otherwise
could not be blocked. In the Airtours case, for instance, economic
analysis suggests that blocking the merger has probably been the right
decision because of unilateral effects. The merger occurs in an industry
which shows very high concentration
63 and entry is unlikely to be so
strong that it would discipline the market power of the major operators.
Only considerable efficiency gains might outweigh the negative impact of
a merger in such a concentrated sector, but large efficiency gains do not
seem likely to occur from this merger
64. Hence, whether the merger does
or not give rise to joint dominance might be discussed, but it would most
likely decrease economic efficiency.
However, the EC Merger Regulation requires the Commission to
prove dominance, and showing that the merger would be likely to
increase prices and reduce welfare is not enough to prohibit it. We feel
that, whether consciously or not, by extending the use of the concept of
joint dominance the Commission is trying to cope with a distortion of the
Merger Regulation, which does not prohibit welfare detrimental mergers
unless they create or reinforce dominance. In other words, it is possible
that the Commission is using the concept of joint dominance as to cover
not only the case of collusion after a merger, but also the case of
unilateral effects of mergers which do not give rise to single firm
dominance. For the sake of transparency and legal certainty, it would be
better if the Commission pushed for a modification of the Merger
Regulation so as to cover unilateral effects, that is, to prohibit mergers
                                                          
63 The post-merger HHI index of concentration estimates is of 2150 and the increase
in concentration of more than 450 (see para 139). We are well beyond the region
where the US authorities would think the merger raises competitive concerns.
64 This can be inferred in various points of the Decision. See for instance para. 146. At
para.99, the Commission reports Airtours' estimates of the minimum efficient scale at
such a level that they are already exhausted by the size of both Airtours and First
Choice before the merger. Scale economies would not accordingly result from the
merger. A disclaimer follows: my knowledge of the case is based only on the text of
the Commission Decision. I do not know whether the views of Airtours' experts on
efficiency are correctly represented in that text.RSC 2000/33 © 2000 Massimo Motta 30
which are welfare detrimental without creating or strengthening
dominance.
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